Question 2. Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

10. Whether something infinite is known self-evidently, as that God exists.

It seems that this is so:

Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.1: “Knowledge of the fact that God exists is naturally implanted in everyone;” but that is self-evidently known the knowledge of which is implanted in everyone, as is clear from Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5, because the first principles, which are as it were the entrance doors, are self-evidently known;     therefore etc     .

11. Further, that than which nothing greater can be thought is self-evidently known to exist; God is of this sort, according to Anselm Proslogion ch.5;     therefore etc     . This thing is also not anything finite, therefore it is infinite. - The proof of the major is that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject: for if the subject does not exist, it is not that thing than which nothing greater can be thought, because, if it existed in reality, it would be greater than if it did not exist in reality but in the intellect.

12. Again, that truth exists is self-evidently known; God is truth; therefore that God exists is self-evidently known. The proof of the major is that it follows from its opposite: for if there were no truth, therefore it is true that there is no truth; therefore there is truth.

13. Again, propositions that have necessity in a certain respect from terms that have existence in a certain respect, namely from the fact that they are in the intellect, are self-evidently known, as first principles which are self-evidently known from terms that have existence in the intellect; therefore much more will that be self-evidently known which has necessity from terms simply necessary, of which sort is the proposition ‘God exists’. The assumption is plain because the necessity of the first principles and their knowability is not because of the existence of the terms in reality but only because of the connection of the extremes as that connection exists in the conceiving intellect.

14. On the contrary:

What is self-evidently known cannot be denied by anyone’s mind; but ‘the fool has said in his heart, there is no God,’ Psalm 13.1, 52.1;     therefore etc     .Interpolation: “Again, Avicenna Metaphysics 1 ch.1 (70rb): ‘That God exists is not known per se, nor is it beyond hope for him to be known.” ⁴⁷

I. To the Second Question

15. Because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.3.995a13-14: “it is absurd to look for knowledge and the way of knowing at the same time,” I reply first to the second question, which inquires about the way of knowing the proposition ‘God exists’. And, as to its solution, I first set down the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, and I say thus:

When a proposition is said to be self-evidently known, the phrase ‘self-evidently’ does not exclude there being any cause, because it does not exclude the terms of the proposition; for no proposition is known when the knowledge of the terms is excluded, because we know the first principles to the extent we know the terms; but what is excluded is any cause and reason outside the per se conception of the terms of a self-evidently known proposition. A self-evidently known proposition, then, is said to be one that gets its evident truth from nothing outside the proper terms that are part of it.Interpolation: “that is, from no other propositional truth but from itself alone does ‘every whole is greater than its part’ get its evidence.” ⁴⁸

16. Next, what are those proper terms from which its evidence should come? - I say that, in this regard, one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, whether the terms are taken for the words that signify or for the concepts signified.Interpolation: “some are to be taken for the thing defined and others for the definition.” ⁴⁹

17. I prove this from the Posterior Analytics 1.6.75a25-27, because the ‘what it is’ or the definition of one of the extremes is the middle term in demonstration; therefore one of the premises does not differ from the conclusion save as the thing defined differs from the definition, and yet the premise is a self-evidently known principle; the conclusion, however, is not self-evidently known but is demonstrated. Therefore as to the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, the concept of the definition is different from the thing defined, because if the concept of the definition and of the thing defined were the same, there would, in the most potent demonstration, be a begging of the question; again, there would then only be two terms there, which is false.

18. This is proved in a second way as follows, through Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a26-b3, that names relate to the definition as the whole to the parts, that is, that a confused name is first known by the definition; but a name introduces confusedly what a definition introduces distinctly, because a definition divides a thing into its individual parts; therefore the concept of a quiddity, as it is introduced by the name confusedly, is naturally known before its concept, as introduced distinctly by the definition, is known, and so it is another concept and another extreme term.Interpolation: “A reason also of this sort can be formed: it is impossible for the same concept to be prior and posterior and to be had and not had about the same thing; but the same thing can be conceived, and is conceived, according to the name before it is so according to the definition, Averroes Physics 1 com.5; therefore the concepts introduced by the name and by the definition are not the same.” ⁵⁰ - From this further: since a self-evidently known proposition is one which has evident truth from the proper terms, and since the other terms are, as introduced by the definition, concepts of the quiddity in a distinct way, and are, as introduced by the name, concepts of the quiddity in a confused way, the conclusion follows that a proposition about a quiddity taken in a confused way will not be self-evidently known when the same proposition is only known if it is conceived distinctly.

19. There is another proof of this conclusion, that otherwise any other proposition, which is necessary and per se in the first mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-37] (as this proposition: ‘man is an animal’ and ‘man is a body’, as far as substance), would be self-evidently known; for if the nature of each extreme is assigned by the natures of the extremes when distinctly conceived, it is plainly manifest that one extreme includes the other. Similarly, otherwise any proposition would be self-evidently known in the special sciences that the metaphysician might possess as self-evidently known from the definitions of the extremes, which is not true, because the geometer does not use any principles as self-evidently known save those that have evident truth from terms confusedly conceived, to wit by conceiving line confusedly; but it is evident that a line is length without breadth without yet any distinct conception, in the way considered by the metaphysician, of what genus line pertains to. But the other propositions that the metaphysician could conceive, to wit that line is a quantity and a quantity of this sort, these sort of propositions are not had by the geometer as self-evidently known.

20. This is clear thirdly because the demonstration of some predicate about a defined thing stands well with the predicate being self-evidently known about the definition.Interpolation: “just as having three angles [equal to two right angles] is demonstrated of a triangle when there is knowledge of its definition, which is: ‘plain figure’ etc.” ⁵¹

21. Therefore all and only those propositions are self-evidently known that, from terms conceived in the way in which they are the terms of the proposition, possess or naturally posses the evident truth of the combined proposition.Interpolation: “That proposition is known per se which gets its evidence, not from another proposition whose truth is more known, but from its own intrinsic terms.” Interpolation to the interpolation: “...as these terms are its own. And I say, as they are its own: either they are confused concepts as confused, or distinct concepts as distinct; for definition and thing defined are not the same terms, because the thing defined is known before the definition is, by the fact that the confused thing or things are known first, Physics 1.1.184a21-22; hence the name of the defined thing involves the intelligible thing in a confused way and in a confused concept, but by the definition is introduced a discrete concept about the same thing; and therefore something can be known per se as to one term, namely the defined term, which is not known as to the definition. Again, a definition is the middle term in demonstration, and the defined thing is the conclusion; and therefore did I say ‘as the terms are its own’, namely confusedly if they are confused and distinctly if the concepts are distinct. Hence the definition as it is the middle is not as it is declarative or more evident to us than the thing defined, but the major proposition or the minor is more evident than the conclusion.” ⁵²

22. From this it is plain that there is no distinction between a self-evidently known and a self-evidently knowable proposition, for they are the same; for a proposition is not called self-evidently known because it is self-evidently known by some intellect (for then, if no intellect actually knew it, no proposition would be self-evidently known), but a proposition is said to be self-evidently known because, as far as depends on the nature of the terms, it is of a nature to possess, even in any intellect that conceives the terms, the evident truth contained in the terms. But if some intellect does not conceive the terms, and so does not conceive the proposition, it is, as far as depends on itself, no less self-evidently known; and it is in this ways that we speak of self-evidently known.

23. From this is also plain that there is no distinction between the self-evidently known in itself to nature and the self-evidently known in itself to us, because whatever is in itself self-evidently known, even if not actually known, is evidently true from the terms and known to any intellect, provided the terms are known.Interpolation: “as is plain in the case of the perfect syllogism, which needs nothing for its necessity to be evident, Prior Analytics 1.1.24b22-24, and Reportatio IA d.3 n.62. But this evidence is from the relation of the principles or the suppositions to the conclusion, which is the relation of necessity.” ⁵³,Text cancelled by Scotus: “For the same reason the distinction is not valid that something is self-evidently known to the wise and the unwise, because this only pertains to the conception of the terms, which are presupposed to the understanding of a self-evidently known proposition, although Boethius, On the Seven Days PL 64, 1311, does thus distinguish the common conception; but either the self-evidently known proposition and the common conception are not the same, or Boethius is understanding a proposition that is conceived, not a proposition that is conceivable, or he is understanding one distinctly conceived by reason of the terms.” ⁵⁴

24. Nor is there any validity to the distinction that some propositions are self-evidently known in the first order and some in the second, because any propositions self-evidently known, when the proper terms are conceived in the way they are the terms, possess evident truth in their own order.

25. From these points I say to the question that the proposition which conjoins these extremes: existence and the divine essence as a this or God and his proper existence, is self-evidently known in the way that God sees this essence and existence under the most proper idea that this existence has in God; and in this way neither existence nor essence are understood by us now, but by God himself and by the blessed, because the proposition has from its terms evident truth for the intellect, for the proposition is not per se in the second mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a37-b5], as when the predicate is outside the idea of the subject, but is per se in the first mode [n.19] and is immediately evident from the terms, for it is the most immediate proposition, to which are resolved all assertions about God however he is conceived. Therefore this proposition ‘God exists’ or ‘this essence exists’ is self-evidently known, because the extremes naturally make the complex whole evident to anyone who perfectly apprehends the extremes of this complex whole, for existence belongs to nothing more perfectly than to this essence. In this way, therefore, understanding by the name ‘God’ something that we do not perfectly know or conceive as being this divine essence, thus is ‘God exists’ self-evidently known.

26. But if it be inquired whether existence is present in some concept which we conceive of God, so that the sort of proposition in which existence is asserted of such a concept is self-evidently known, for example as about a proposition whose extreme terms can be conceived by us, that is, whether existence can in our intellect be a concept said of God, though not one common to him and to creatures, namely necessary existence or infinite being or supreme good, and we can of such a concept predicate existence in the way it is conceived by us, - I say that no such proposition is self-evidently known, for three reasons:

27. First, because any such proposition is a demonstrable conclusion, and a ‘conclusion-why’. Proof: anything that first and immediately belongs to something can be demonstrated of whatever is in itInterpolation: “whether in a superior or inferior, or of a passion.” ⁵⁵ by a ‘demonstration-why’ through what it first belongs to as through the middle term.Interpolation: “about the superior particularly or about the particular universally.” ⁵⁶ An example: if the triangle is what first has three angles equal to two right angles, of whatever is contained in triangle there can be a demonstration that it has three angles by a ‘demonstration-why’ through the middle term which is triangle, to wit that some figure would have three [angles equal to.. ,|     etc ., and also about any kind of triangle that it has three angles., although not first. But existence belongs first to this essence as this essence, in the way it is seen by the blessed; therefore      of anything in this essence that can be conceived by us, whether it be as something superior or as a property, existence can be demonstrated through this essence, as through the middle term, by a ‘demonstration-why’, just as by this proposition ‘a triangle has three.’ there is a demonstration that some figure has three.; and consequently it is not self-evidently known from the terms, because then there would be no ‘demonstration-why’.Interpolation: “Or let the reason be given in briefer form thus: what belongs to something first does not belong to another save by the nature of what to which it belongs first; but existence belongs first to this divine essence, therefore it will not belong to any other property or any other thing save by the nature of the essence. Therefore no proposition in which existence is asserted of any property of this essence that we conceive about God is true first, but is true by something else, and consequently it is not first and not known per se.” ⁵⁷

28. Second in this way: a self-evidently known proposition is self-evidently known to any intellect from the terms. But this proposition ‘there is an infinite being’ is not evident to our intellect from the terms; proof: for we do not conceive the terms before we believe the proposition or know it by demonstration, and it is not known to us in that ‘before’; for we do not hold it with certitude from the terms save by faith or demonstration.

29. Third, because nothing about a concept that is not simply simple is self-evidently known unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of that concept are united; but no concept that we have of God which is proper to him and does not belong to creatures is simply simple, or at any rate no concept that we distinctly conceive to be proper to God is simply simple;Note by Scotus: “This minor is set down on the basis of the opinion about the univocity of the concept that is common to God and creatures, but if this opinion is changed let this minor be taken: ‘many concepts in which we conceive God are not simply simple’, and a particular conclusion follows, not a universal one as from the two reasons [nn.27-28]. The minor might be taken in another way thus: ‘no concept of ours that is proper to God and that we perceive to be proper to God is simply simple’, because although the concept of being taken from creatures is simply simple and proper to God according to another opinion [sc. the opinion that being is analogical, not univocal, to God and creatures], yet it is not a proper percept, because according to Henry [of Ghent] it seems that in that concept, because of its likeness and simplicity, we do not distinguish God from other things, -understand: we do not distinguish in a perceptible way, because although the concept is distinct, yet it is not perceived by us as a distinct concept.” ⁵⁸ therefore nothing is self-evidently known about such a concept unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but this is not self-evidently known, because the union of these parts is something demonstrated, by the two reasons mentioned [nn.27-28].

30. The major is manifest from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.29.1024b31-32, that an account in itself false is false about everything; therefore no account is true about anything unless it is in itself true. Therefore in order for something to be true about some account, or for the account to be true about anything, one must known that it is in itself true; but no account is in itself true unless the parts of the account are united. And just as one must know as regard quidditative predications that the parts of the account can be united quidditatively, to wit that one formally contains the other, so as regard the truth of a proposition asserting existence one must know that the parts of the account of the subject or of the predicate are actually united. An example: just as the proposition ‘man is an irrational animal’ is not self-evidently known when speaking of quidditative predication, because the subject includes something in itself false, for it includes a proposition that includes contradictories in itself, so the proposition ‘a man is white’ is not self-evidently known if it is not self-evidently known that man and white are actually per se conjoined; because if they are not conjoined in actual existence, this proposition is true ‘nothing is a white man’, and consequently its converse will be true ‘no white man is’; therefore its contradictory is false ‘a white man is’.

31. Proof of the minor: whatever concept we conceive, whether of good or of true, if it is not contracted by something so that it is not a concept simply simple, is not a proper concept of God. Now I call a concept simply simple which is not resolvable into other simple concepts any one of which might in a simple act be distinctly conceived.

32. From this final reason [sc. the third, nn.29-31] a response to the [following] instances is clear, when the argument is made ‘this is self-evidently known, necessary existence exists’ - proof, because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if the predicate is not, ‘necessary existence’ does not exist - ‘this too is self-evidently known, God exists’, because, according to all the expositions posited by Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.9, God is called so from actual operation, namely from warming or burning or seeing,Damascene derived the Greek for ‘God’ (Theos) from Greek words signifying these operations. ⁵⁹ therefore, according to all acceptations of the term, ‘God exists’ is the same as ‘God is actually operating’, which seems self-evidently known, because, as before, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject.Text cancelled by Scotus: “It is said that this proposition ‘the one who is actually operating is’ the ‘is’ can be predicated as an additional third thing, or as a second thing, and thus that the ‘is’ is predicated as present being or as habitual being [sc. the difference between ‘a just man is’ - where ‘is’ is second thing, namely a predicate of existence - and ‘a man is just’ - where ‘is’ is a third thing, namely the copula joining subject and predicate]; in the first way the proposition is not self-evidently known, in the second way it is self-evidently known. But this is not logically said, because according to the Philosopher On Interpretation 10.19b19-22, ‘is’ is not predicated as additional third except when the third is additional as a predicate; but, when no third is additional, it predicates existence proper, which is to be predicated as second thing; but here nothing is additional; therefore it predicates precisely what exists in itself, and so it is predicated as second thing.” ⁶⁰

33. For this reason I reply to these points [n.32] in another way, that neither of these propositions, ‘necessary existence exists’ or ‘the one actually operating exists’, is self-evidently known, because it is not self-evidently known that the parts that are in the subject are actually united. When it is said that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’ [n.32], I say that it does not follow from this that the proposition is self-evidently known unless the repugnance is self-evident, and unless it is evident also along with this that each extreme has a simply simple concept or that the concepts of the parts are simply united.Text cancelled by Scotus: “Against this: if the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject, then the consequence is good of putting the subject in some antecedent and the predicate in some consequent, inferring the consequent from an antecedent of that kind, to wit ‘a is necessarily existent, therefore a exists’, because the opposite of the consequent is repugnant to the antecedent. But every necessary consequence holds by virtue of some necessary categorical proposition, and thus the categorical is what unites the extremes, by reason of which the consequence holds; therefore such a proposition is necessary, to wit this one ‘necessary existence exists’ and ‘the one who is actually operating exists’. I reply: when in the antecedent are included two opposites and a consequent is inferred, it is not inferred by reason of the whole antecedent extreme, because the whole extreme does not make any single concept, but only by reason of one part of the extreme, to wit the inference ‘an irrational man exists, therefore an animal exists’. The reason for the consequence is not ‘irrational man’, because it does not make any concept, but ‘man’ in the antecedent and ‘animal’ in the consequent; and therefore a categorical proposition that is per se true must be formed from those extremes, namely these: ‘man’ is ‘animal’. So in the proposed case: if the proposition has an extreme that is not simply simple, whose parts are not self-evidently known to be united, and something is inferred by reason of such non-simply simple extreme, it is inferred by reason of a part of it which includes what is inferred in the consequent; and therefore it holds by virtue of a categorical proposition which conjoins these two things, namely one part of the antecedent extreme and one part of the consequent extreme. This categorical is ‘existence exists’, but not ‘necessary existence exists’. The same response is made to ‘if it does not actually exist, it is not operating,’ and to the reverse ‘if it is operating, it is a being in actuality’: for in the subject several things are included, one of which is precisely the reason for the consequence, but the whole subject is not; and therefore there is no necessary proposition uniting the whole extreme of the antecedent with the extreme of the consequent.” ⁶¹

II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

34. To the principal argument of Damascene [n.10]: it can be expounded of the cognitive power naturally given to us by which we can know from creatures that God exists, at rate in general ideas (he subjoins there how he is known from creatures! On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.3), or it can be expounded of the knowledge of God under common ideas that agree with himself and with creatures, which are known more perfectly and eminently in God than in other things. But that Damascene is not speaking of actual and distinct knowledge of God is clear from what he says there: “no one knows him save to the extent he himself has given revelation.”

35. To the second [n.11] I say that Anselm does not say that that proposition is self-evidently known, as is clear, because from his deduction it cannot be inferred that the proposition is true save through at least two syllogisms, one of which is this: ‘being is greater than any non-being, nothing is greater than the supreme thing,     therefore the supreme being is not a non-being’, from oblique forms in the second mood of the second figure [of syllogism]; the other syllogism is this: ‘what is not a non-being is a being, the supreme thing is not a non-being, therefore etc     .’ But how his reasoning is valid will be explained in the following question, in the sixth argument [n.137], about proving infinity.

36. As to the proof of the major [n.11] (I say the major is false when ‘it is self-evidently known’ is taken; however the major is true, though not self-evidently known), when it is proved that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’, I say that it is neither self-evident that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject nor is it self-evident that the subject possesses a simply simple concept or that its parts are united in fact; and both these are required for that proposition to be self-evidently known.

37. To the third [n.12] I say that the inference ‘it is self-evidently known that truth in general exists, therefore it is self-evidently known that God exists’ does not follow but is the fallacy of the consequent;The argument in n.12 is of the form: it is self-evident that truth exists; this truth (namely God) exists; therefore this truth is self-evident. The argument commits the fallacy of the consequent because the premise proceeds from self-evidence to truth, and the conclusion does the reverse, proceeding from truth to self-evidence; cf. Aristotle Sophistical Refutations 1.5.167b1-13. ⁶² alternatively, the major can be denied. And when it is proved ‘if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth’, the consequence is not valid, because truth is taken either for the foundation of truth in reality, or for truth in the act of the intellect combining and dividing; but if there is no truth, neither is it true that there is no truth, whether by the truth of reality, because there is nothing, or by the truth in the intellect combining and dividing, because there is no intellect. However the inference does indeed follow, ‘if there is no truth, therefore it is not true that there is any truth’, but the further inference does not follow, ‘therefore it is true that there is not any truth’; it is the fallacy of the consequent, from a negative having two causes of truth to an affirmative which is one of those causes.The conditional ‘if there is no truth, it is not true that there is any truth’, is a double negative; the conclusion ‘it is true that there is no truth’ is an affirmation of the antecedent. But to conclude to the affirmation of the antecedent of a conditional is to commit the fallacy of the consequent. ⁶³

38. To the last principal argument [n.13] I say that propositions are not said to be self-evidently known because the extremes have a greater necessity in themselves, or a greater necessity in reality outside the intellect, but because the extremes, as they are the extremes of such a proposition, show evidently that their combination is in conformity with the natures of the terms and with the relation of them, and this whatever being the terms have, whether in reality or in the intellect; for the evidence of this conformity is the evidence of the truth in the proposition, which is the proposition’s being self-evidently known. But, as it is, the propositionInterpolation: “in my intellect the proposition ‘infinite being is’ is of a nature to be evident from the terms, but.” ⁶⁴ ‘every whole is greater than its part’, or anything similar, in any intellect that conceives the terms, naturally has such evidence from the terms, because from the terms it is evident that the combined proposition is in conformity with the relation and nature of the terms, whatever being the terms have; and therefore although there is less necessity in the terms, it does not follow that there is less evidence in the propositions.

III. To the First Question

39. To the first question [nn.1-9] I proceed as follows, that it cannot be demonstrated for us in this way by a ‘demonstration-why’ that an infinite being exists, although from the nature of the terms the proposition is demonstrable by a ‘demonstration-why’. But for us the proposition is indeed demonstrable by a ‘demonstration-that’ from creatures [Posterior Analytics 1.13.78a22-b34]. Now the properties of an infinite being that are relative to creatures are related more immediately than are absolute terms to things that are the middles in a ‘demonstration-that’, so that it can more immediately about the relative properties than about the absolute properties be concluded that an infinite being exists through what are middle terms in such a demonstration, for from the existence of one relative the existence of its correlative immediately follows; therefore I will first make existence clear about the relative properties of an infinite being, and second I will make existence clear about the infinite being, because the relative properties belong only to an infinite being; and thus there will be two principal articles.

40. As to the first article I say: the properties of an infinite being that are relative to creatures are properties either of causality or of eminence; the causality is double, either efficient or final. As to what is added about the exemplar cause, it is not a genus of cause other than the efficient cause, because then there would be five genera of causes; hence the exemplar cause is a sort of efficient cause, because, in distinction from what operates through nature, it operates through the intellect, about which elsewhere [1 d.36 q. un n.5].

A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

41. In the first principal article I will principally show three things. First then I will show that there is something in effect among beings which is simply firstInterpolation: “with ever primacy that does not include any imperfection. For the part is more imperfect than the whole and yet is prior; for a part shares in the entity of the whole and is not itself the whole. But there are other primacies that do not include any imperfection, as the primacy of eminence and of triple causal independence, namely, efficient cause, formal or exemplar cause, and final cause. But the primacy of eminence is not the primacy of causality; for one being is not the cause of another from the fact that it is preeminent over it, for the first and the supreme in any genus is preeminent over any other posterior in that genus and yet it is not the cause of it. Also exemplar primacy is not distinguished from the primacy of efficient causality, because a principle that is the exemplar of other things in intelligible being is only an efficient principle through the intellect; for just as a natural efficient cause does not distinguish efficient causality but is contained under it, so neither is the exemplar cause distinguished from the efficient cause. So there are two causalities, distinct from each other, namely of efficient causality and final causality. And all those primacies that we attribute to God do not include any imperfection. - Hence first I will show that there exists something in fact among beings that is simply first.” ⁶⁵ in efficient causality, and that there is also something which is simply first in idea of end, and something which is simply first in eminence; second I show that that which is first in one idea of primacy is first also in the other primacies; and third I show that that triple primacy belongs to one nature only such that it does not belong to several natures differing in species or in quiddity. And so in the first principal article there will be three partial articles.

42. [First partial article] - The first article among them includes three principal conclusions, because of the triple primacy; but each of the three conclusions has three conclusions on which it depends: the first is that something is first, the second is that that thing cannot be caused, the third is that that thing actually exists in reality. And so in the first article there are nine conclusions, but three principal conclusions.

43. Now the first conclusion of these nine is as follows, that some efficient cause is simply first such that neither can it be an effect nor can it, by virtue of something other than itself, cause an effect. The proof is that some being can be an effect. An effect of itself, then, or of nothing, or of something else. Not of nothing, because that which is nothing is cause of nothing; nor of itself, because there is nothing that makes or generates itself, Augustine On the Trinity 1 ch.1 n.1; therefore of something else. Let this something else be a. If a is first in the way expounded [n.43 init.], I have the proposition intended; if it is not first, then it is effective derivatively, because it can be the effect of another or cause an effect by virtue of another, for if a negation is denied the affirmation is asserted.To deny that a thing cannot be an effect or cause an effect by virtue of another is to assert that it can be an effect and cause an effect by virtue of another. ⁶⁶ Let that other be granted and let it be b, about which one argues as was argued about a, and thus either one proceeds ad infinitum, where each thing will be second in respect of a prior, or one stops at something that has no prior; but an infinity is impossible in ascending causes, therefore primacy is necessary, because what does not have a prior is posterior to nothing posterior to itself, for a circle in causes is discordant.Interpolation: “because then the same thing would be prior and posterior to itself.” ⁶⁷

44. Against this reasoning there is a double instance: first,Interpolation: “because it seeks a stand in causes.” ⁶⁸ that according to philosophizers an infinity in ascending causes is possible, as in the example they posit about infinite generations,Interpolation: “none of which is first but each is second, because according to them an infinite process is not discordant in the case of productions of the same nature.” ⁶⁹ where none is first but each is second, and yet they posited this without circularity.

45. Second, it seems that the argument proceeds from contingents and so is not a demonstration. The proof of the antecedent is that the premises assume the existence of something that is caused; everything such exists contingently.Interpolation: “likewise, it proceeds from contingents, because it proceeds from the ideas of producer and produced, which are only contingent terms.” ⁷⁰

46. To exclude the first instance [n.44] I say that the philosophers did not posit that an infinity was possible in essentially ordered causes but only in accidentally ordered ones, as is clear from Avicenna in Metaphysics 6 ch.5 94rb-va, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species.

47. And, in order to show the proposed point better, one must know that there are causes essentially ordered and causes that are accidentally ordered. Here one must note that it is one thing to speak of causes per se and per accidens, and another to speak of causes per se that are essentially and accidentally ordered. For in the first case there is only comparison of one thing with another, namely of the cause with the thing caused; and a cause per se causes according to its proper nature and not according to something accidental to itInterpolation: “as the subject is the per se cause with respect to its own property, even in other cases, as ‘the white disperses [sight]’ and ‘the builder builds’.” ⁷¹ and a cause per accidens is the reverse;Interpolation: “as ‘Polycleitus builds’.” ⁷² in the second case the comparison is of two causes with each other, insofar as something is caused by them.

48. And causes that are per se or essentially ordered differ from causes that are per accidens or accidentally ordered in three ways.

49. The first difference is that in per se ordered causes the second depends for its causing on the first, but not in per accidens ordered causes, even though the second is dependent in existence or in something else.Interpolation: “for although the son depends for his existence on his father, yet he does not so depend in causing, because he can act when his father is dead just as when his father is alive.” ⁷³

50. The second difference is that in per se ordered causes there is causality of a second nature and a second order, because the superior cause is more perfect, but this is not the case in accidentally ordered causes; and this difference follows from the first, for no cause essentially depends for its causing on a cause of the same nature, because in the causing of something one thing of one nature is enough.

51. The third difference is that all causes ordered essentially and per se are necessarily required simultaneously for the causing, otherwise some essential and per se causality would be lacking for the effect; but it is not so in the case of accidentally ordered causes, because the simultaneity of them in causing is not required.Interpolation: “because any cause has its own perfect causality without any respect of its effect; for it is enough that one cause successively causes after the other.” Interpolation: “From the three differences come three reasons: from the first, that the totality of causes is dependent in causing, therefore dependent on something that is not part of the totality; from the second, that the infinitely superior will be infinitely more perfect; from the third, that infinite things are actual all at once. There is an additional fourth reason which proves that a possible thing which does not include imperfection is already shown to be in existence. - But if an essential order is denied, because an accidental order is sufficient for the sense, on the contrary I give this proof: a is being caused by something; a nature that can be produced in one supposit can be produced in any supposit; so the reason by which it is now in this supposit is reason that it was before in that supposit and in that other supposit. No succession of things goes on continually save by virtue of something permanent; that permanent thing is no part of the succession; therefore besides the individual in the species doing the generating there is some other superior agent. - From this result I infer that that agent is the surpassing first thing, because an equivocal agent is more actual and independent and that on which the other things depend. It is the first end, because there is some end on account of which it per se acts, Physics 25.196b17-22; not on account of any of the effects other than itself, because these are less good. Likewise, nothing else does it naturally or by reason most of all love. Fourth, it is the first exemplar thing because it is a per se agent; so either it acts for an end that it knows or for an end it is directed to by something that knows; also it knows everything that can be made, because it orders them to the end and wills them for the end. Solution to the second question: there are not two supereminent things. - Again, there are always as many essential features, hence and thence and in different species, as there are coordinate orderings, because they do not have one idea here and there, nor here to one and there to two first totalities. Note the process of this solution, which is as follows: the first conclusion is that there is some first efficient thing; this conclusion is first proved in a confused way [n.43], second in a distinct way (through the three propositions [nn.53-55], the first of which is proved after five manners [n.53]), and two instances against it are ruled out [nn.44-46, 56]. The second conclusion is that the first thing cannot be caused [n.57]. The third conclusion: thus the first thing is actually existent [n.58]. Hence follow three similar conclusions about the first end [nn.60-62]. Hence three similar ones about the first supreme thing [nn.64-66]. Hence, that the first efficient cause is first in two other ways; two conclusions follow [nn.68-69]. Hence, that thus the first thing is one nature; which is shown in four ways, namely because it necessarily exists, because it is highest, because it is ultimate end, because it is the termination of dependency [nn.70-73]. In the second principal article the preliminaries are first proved, and there are three conclusions [nn.75, 89, 98; a fourth conclusion in n.105]; hence, that the first thing has intelligence and will, by three reasons [nn.76-79]; hence that its understanding itself is the same as its essence [n.89]; hence, that no understanding is an accident of it, by four reasons [nn.98-101]. Hence is the principal intention proved, namely infinity; first, through efficient causality, by treatment of Aristotle’s reason in Physics 8.10.266a10-24, b6-20, 267b17-26 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-13, [nn.111-124]; second, through actual knowledge of infinites [nn.125-127] and, in line with this, by an argument about intuitive knowledge of effects [nn.128-129]; third, through the idea of the end [n.130]; fourth, through the idea of preeminence [nn.131-139].” ⁷⁴

52. These points make the proposed conclusion clear, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. Likewise second, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes; therefore in every way an infinity in essentially ordered causes is impossible. Even if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible; therefore in every way there is some first thing that is necessarily and simply efficient cause. - Of these three assumed propositions let the first for brevity’s sake be called a, the second b, and the third c.

53. Proof of the three propositions.

First a, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. The proof is first thatInterpolation: “in essentially ordered causes, where the adversary posits an infinity of them, a second cause, insofar as it causes, depends on a first (from the first difference [n.49]). So if there were an infinity of causes, things are such that not only any later cause but any cause at all depends on its own immediate cause, therefore etc.” ⁷⁵ the totality of essentially ordered causes is from some cause that is not any part of the totality, because then it would be cause of itself. For the whole totality of dependent things is dependent, and not on any part of the totality.Interpolation: “and this thing I call the first efficient cause. So if there are infinite causes, they still depend on some other cause that is not part of the totality.” ⁷⁶ Second that an infinite number of causes, namely of essentially ordered causes, would actually exist at once, from the third difference above [n.51],Interpolation [replacing the second argument in the text]: “if an infinite number of essentially ordered causes were to come together in the production of some effect, and if, from the third difference [n.51], all essentially ordered causes exist together at once, it follows that an infinite number of things exist together at once in causing this effect.” ⁷⁷ which no philosopher has posited. - Next, third, that the prior is what is nearer to the beginning, Metaphysics 5.11.1018b9-11; therefore where there is no beginning, nothing is essentially prior. - Next, fourth, that the superior cause is more perfect in causing, from the second difference [n.50]; therefore what is infinitely superior is infinitely more perfect, and so possessed of infinite perfection in causing, and consequently it does not cause in virtue of another, because anything of this latter sort causes imperfectly, as being dependent in causing on another cause. - Next, fifth, that an effective thing does not necessarily posit any imperfection; therefore it can be in something without imperfection.Interpolation: “because what involves no imperfection can be supposed to exist without imperfection among things.” ⁷⁸ But if no cause is without dependence on something prior, it will not be in anything without imperfection. Therefore independent effective causality can exist in some nature, and this nature is simply first; therefore effective causality simply first is possible. This is enough, because from this the conclusion is later [n.58] drawn that such a first effective cause, if it is possible, exists in reality. And thus by five reasons is a made plain.

54. Proof of b [n.52], namely that an infinity in accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes, because an accidental infinity, if posited, is not simultaneous, clearly, but only successive, as one after another, such that the second in a way flows from the prior. Yet it does not depend on the prior in causing; for it can cause when the prior does not exist just as when it does exist, as a son generates when his father is dead just as when he is alive. Such an infinity of succession is impossible save from some nature that endures permanently, on which the whole succession and any part of it depend. For no deform-ness is perpetuated save in virtue of some permanent thing that is no part of the succession, because all the successive members of the succession are of the same nature;Interpolation: “and because no part of a succession can persist along with the whole succession, for then it would not be part of the succession.” ⁷⁹ but something is essentially prior, because any part of the succession depends on it, and that in another form of order than on the proximate cause which is some part of the succession.Interpolation: “Everything therefore that depends on a cause accidentally ordered depends more essentially on a cause per se and essentially ordered; nay rather, when an essential order is denied the accidental order will be denied, because accidents do not have an order save by means of something fixed and permanent, nor consequently are they multiplied to infinity.” [In other words, an infinite series of accidentally ordered causes must at least have an abiding matter underlying it, and this matter will underlie it as a per se and essentially ordered cause.] ⁸⁰ So b is plain.

55. There is proof too of c [n.52], that if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible. The proof is that since, from the first reason here adduced, namely that nothing can be from nothing [n.43], it follows that some nature is effective, if an essential order of active causes is denied then this nature causes in virtue of nothing else; and although it be in some individual posited as caused yet in another it is not caused, which is the proposed conclusion about nature; or, if it be in anything posited as caused, at once a contradiction is implied if one denies an essential order, because no nature can be in anything posited as caused such that there be an accidental order under it without an essential order to some other nature.

56. To the second instance posited above, which says that the reasoning proceeds of contingents and so is not a demonstration [n.43],Interpolation: “when I say ‘some nature has been truly brought about, therefore something is the efficient cause of it’.” ⁸¹ I respond that one might argue thus: some nature is effected because some subject is changed, and so the term of the change begins to be in the subject, and so that term or composite is produced or effected; therefore there is some efficient thing, by the nature of correlatives, and then the first reason [n.43] can in truth be contingent, but it is manifest. - However, one can argue thus, by proving the first conclusion [n.43] in this way: this reasoning is true, ‘some nature is effectible, therefore some nature is effective’. The proof of the antecedent is that some subject is changeable, because some being is possible, by distinguishing the possible from the necessary [Prior Analytics 1.13.32a18-20: ‘the contingent is that which, whether it exists or not, nothing impossible follows’], and by proceeding in this way from necessaries. And then the proof of the first conclusion is about quidditative being or about possible being, but not about actual existence. But actual existence will be proved further in the third conclusion of that of which possibility is being proved now [n.58].

57. The second conclusion about the first effective thing is this, that the simply first effective thing cannot be caused [n.42]. The proof is that it is an in-effectible independent effective thing. This is clear first [n.43] because, if it is causative by virtue of another or is effectible by another, then either there is a process to infinity, or a circle, or a stand at some in-effectible independent effective thing; that thing I say is first, and anything else is plainly not first, from the things you have granted. Therefore there is also this further conclusion: if that first thing is in-effectible then it is un-causable, because it is not causable by an end, or by matter, or by form. The proof of the first consequence, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by an end, is that the final cause only causes because the final cause moves metaphorically the efficient cause to bringing about its effect, for the entity of a thing with an end does not in any other way depend on the end as on something prior; but nothing is a cause per se unless the caused thing essentially depends on it as on something prior. - Now the two other consequences, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by matter or by form, are proved together because what does not have an extrinsic cause does not have an intrinsic cause either, because the causality of an extrinsic cause implies perfection without any imperfection, but the causality of an intrinsic cause necessarily implies some imperfection annexed to it, because an intrinsic cause is part of the caused thing; therefore the nature of an extrinsic cause is naturally prior to the nature of an intrinsic cause. So once the prior is denied so is the posterior. - The same consequences are also proved by the fact that intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic ones, whether in their existence, or insofar as they cause the composite, or in both ways, because intrinsic causes do not cause the composite by themselves without an agent. - From these statements the second conclusion is plain.

58. The third conclusion about the first effective thing is this: the first effective thing is actually existing and some nature is truly actually existent in the way it is effective [n.42]. Its proof: if that to whose nature it is repugnant to be from another can exist, it can exist from itself; but it is repugnant to the nature of the simply first effective thing to be from another, as is plain from the second conclusion [n.57]; likewise too it can exist, as is plain from the first conclusion where the fifth proof for a was set down [n.53], which proof seems to establish too little and yet it establishes this. But the other proofs for that very a [n.53] can be brought to bear on the existence which this third conclusion proposes, and they are about contingents, though manifest ones; or let them be taken of the nature and quiddity and possibility of a, and they proceed from necessities. Therefore a simply first effective thing can be from itself. But what is not from itself cannot be from itself, because then a non-being would bring something into being, which is impossible, and further it would then cause itself and so would not be altogether un-causable. - This last point, namely about the existence of the first effective, is made clear in another way, because for the universe to lack a possible supreme grade in its being is discordant.

59. In accord with the three conclusions shown about the first effective thing, note a certain corollary, that it contains as it were the three proved conclusions, namely that the first effective thing is not only prior to other things but, because a contradiction is involved in something else’s being prior, thus, to the extent it is first, it exists. The proof is as in the preceding [n.58]; for un-causability is most included in the idea of such a first, as is proved from the second [n.57]; for if it can be (because this does not contradict its being, as proved from the first [nn.53, 56]), it follows that it can be of itself, and so it is of itself.

60. In accord with the first three conclusions about the efficient cause I propose three similar conclusions about the final cause.

Some final cause is simply first, that is, it is neither orderable to another nor is it naturally end of other things in virtue of something else. And it is proved by five reasons similar to those set down for the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.53].

61. The second conclusion is that the first final cause is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, otherwise it would not be first; and, further, therefore it is in-effectible. The proof of this consequence is that every per se agent acts for an end, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22, where the Philosopher intends this to hold also of nature, about which it is less evident than about an agent that acts from deliberate choice. But that of which there is no per se efficient cause is not effectible, because in no genus can the per accidens be first, as is plain in the proposed case, especially about causes acting per accidens, which are chance and fortune, that according to Aristotle, Physics 2.6.196a5-13, are necessarily reduced to causes acting per se as to things prior, namely to nature and intellect and deliberate choice. Of that therefore of which there is no per se agent there will be no agent; but of that of which there is no end there is no per se agent; therefore it will be in-effectible, for what is causable by an end is excelled in goodness by the end and consequently in perfection, - and so on, as was proved of the first effective cause [n.57].

62. The third conclusion is that the first final cause is actually existent and that to some actually existing nature that primacy belongs. The proof is from the first way about efficient causality [n.58].

63. A corollary: it follows that the first is so first that a prior being is impossible, and this is proved like the corollary in the prior way [n.59].

64. To the three conclusions about both orders of extrinsic causality I propose three similar conclusions about the order of eminence.

Some eminent nature is simply first in perfection. This is plain because an order among essences is essential, for according to Aristotle forms are related like numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33; in this order there is a stand, which is proved by the five ways above about a stand in effective causes [n.53].

65. The second conclusion is that a supreme nature is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, from the points preceding [nn.57, 62]; therefore it is in-effectible and, further, therefore un-causable. These two consequences were proved in the second conclusion about efficient causes [n.57]. Again, that the supreme nature is in-effectible is proved because every effectible has some essentially ordered cause, as is plain from the proof of b itself in the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.54]; but an essentially ordered cause excels its effect.

66. The third conclusion is that a supreme nature is something actually existing, and it is proved from the preceding [nn.58, 62].

67. Corollary: that there be some nature more eminent or superior to it involves a contradiction; the proof is like the corollary about the effective thing and the end [nn.59, 63].

68. [Second partial article] - As to the second article [n.41] I say that the first efficient cause is the ultimate end.Cf. Averroes Metaphysics 10 com.7, 12 com.6: “the formal, final, and moving principles are not three in number, but one in subject and three in idea.” ⁸² The proof is that every efficient cause per se acts for an end, and a prior efficient cause for a prior end; therefore the first efficient cause for the ultimate end. But it acts principally and ultimately for nothing other than itself; therefore it acts for itself as for an end. Therefore the first efficient cause is the first end.Interpolation: “For if it were to act per se for an end other than itself, then there would be something more noble than the first efficient cause, because an end which is something separate from the agent intending the end is more noble than the agent.” ⁸³

69. Likewise, the first efficient cause is the first eminent cause. The proof is that the first efficient cause is not univocal with other effective natures, but is equivocal; therefore it is more eminent and more noble than they. Therefore the first efficient cause is most eminent.

70. [Third partial article] - As to the third article [n.41] I say that since that in which there is the triple primacy is the same thing, for that in which one primacy is the others are too, there is also in it a triple identity such that the first efficient cause is only one in quiddity and in nature. To show this I show first a certain preliminary conclusion, and second the principal conclusion.

Now the preliminary conclusion is that the efficient cause that is first by this triple primacy is necessarily existent of itself. The proof is that it is through and through un-causable, for there is a contradiction involved in something’s being prior to it in the genus of efficient or final cause and consequently in the genus of any cause at all;     therefore it is altogether un-causable. From this I argue: a thing cannot not be unless there is something positively or privatively incompossible with it that can be; but in the case of that which is from itself and is through and through un-causable there cannot be anything which is positively or privatively incompossible with it; therefore etc     . The major is plain, because no being can be destroyed save by what is positively or privatively incompossible with it. The proof of the minor is that that incompossible thing can either be from itself or from another; if it can be from itself and it is from itself, then two incompossible things will be at the same time, or neither of them exists, because each destroys the being of the other; if it can be from another, then to the contrary: no cause can destroy some being on account of the repugnance of its effect to that being unless it give to its effect a more perfect and intense being than is the being of the other destructible thing; of no being from another is its being from its cause nobler than is the being of something necessary of itself, because every caused thing has dependent being, but what is from itself has independent being.

71. Further, to the intended proposition, there is proof from this of the unity of the first nature, which is the thing principally intended in this third article. This is shown by three reasons.

First in this way, that if two natures are necessarily existent they are distinguished by some real proper reasons, and let them be called a and b. The reasons are either formally necessary or not. If they are,Interpolation: “and, beside this, those two natures are formally necessary through that in which they agree.” ⁸⁴ then each nature will be necessarily existent by two formal reasons, which is impossible, because since neither of the reasons per se includes the other, each of the natures, when taken separately, would be necessarily existent.Interpolation: “through the other nature, and so there would be something necessarily existent that is no less necessarily existent when the thing through which it is so has been taken away [n.177].” ⁸⁵ But if by the reasons by which they are distinguished neither one of them is formally necessarily existent, then the reasons are not reasons for necessarily existing, and so neither of them is included in necessary existence, because whatever is not necessarily existent is of itself possible, but nothing possible is included in necessary existence.Interpolation: “because necessary existence includes nothing that is not necessarily existent or the reason for necessarily existing [n.177].” ⁸⁶

72. The second proof is that there cannot be two most eminent natures in the universe; therefore neither can there be two first effective things. The proof of the antecedent is that species are related as numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33, and consequently there cannot be two in the same order; therefore much less can there be two first or two most eminent natures.

73. This is also plain, third, by reasoning about the idea of end, because if there were two ultimate ends, they would have two coordinate orders of beings related to them such that these beings here would have no order to those beings there, because they would have no order to the end of those beings either, for things that are ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another end, because there cannot be two total and perfect causes in the same order of the same caused thing; for then something would be in some order a per se cause such that, when it was not posited, the caused thing would nevertheless be. Therefore things ordered to one end are in no way ordered to another end, nor consequently ordered to things that are ordered to the other end, and so from them no universe would come to be. - There is also a general confirmation of this, that there cannot be two things that are the total term of the dependence of some one and the same thing, because then a thing would be the term of a dependence such that, when it was removed, the dependence would no less have a term, and so it would not be a dependence on that thing. But other things are essentially dependent on the efficient and eminent and final cause. Therefore there cannot be two natures that are the first terms of other things according to that triple dependence. There is therefore precisely some one nature which is the term of beings in accord with that triple dependence, and so which has that triple primacy.

B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

74. Having shown the relative properties of the first being, I proceed further as follows to show the infinity of the first being and consequently the existence of an infinite being: first I show that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will such that its intelligence is of infinites distinctly and that its essence is representative of infinites (which essence indeed is its intelligence), and from this will be shown, secondly, its infinity. And thus, along with the triple primacy already shown, there will be a fourfold means for showing its infinity. But yet as to the fourth means, namely that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will, from which, as from a means added to the other three, its infinity is proved, I make a certain assumption with respect to it until distinction 35 [Ordinatio I d.35 q. un. n.2].

1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

75. Now, that the first being has intelligence and will I argue thus: some agent is a per se first agent, because to every cause per accidens some cause per se is prior, Physics 2.6.198a8-9, where Aristotle intends this of nature, about which it is less evident; but every agent per se acts for an end.

76. And from this there is a twofold argument.

First thus: every natural agent, precisely considered, would act of necessity and just as much if it were not to act for any other end but was acting independently;     therefore if it does not act save for an end, this is because it depends on an agent that loves the end; of such a sort is the first efficient cause, therefore etc     .

77. Again, if the first agent acts for an end, then that end moves the first efficient cause either as loved by an act of will or as only naturally loved. If as loved by an act of will, the intended conclusion is gained. If only naturally loved, this is false, because it does not naturally love an end other than itself in the way the heavy loves the center and matter loves form; for then it would in some way be in relation to an end because inclined to an end. But if it only naturally loves the end which is itself, this is nothing save itself being itself, for this does not preserve the doubleness of idea in itself.The point seems to be that if the first being’s love of the end is natural then, first, this end cannot be something other than itself (as it is in the case of other things that naturally tend to an end, as a heavy thing tending downwards), and, second, if therefore this end is just itself and it naturally loves it, then there is in it no doubleness of end and natural love of the end (as in the case of a heavy thing tending downwards), so that its being is its very self-loving, which is a knowing and willing itself. ⁸⁷

78. Another argument, by as it were bringing together the reason already made, is as follows: the first efficient cause itself directs its effect to an end;     therefore it directs either naturally or by knowing and loving the end. Not naturally, because a non-knower directs nothing save in virtue of a knower; for it belongs first to the wise to order things, Metaphysics 1.2.982a17-18; but the first efficient cause directs in virtue of nothing else, just as neither does it cause in virtue of anything else, - for then it would not be first; therefore etc     .

79. Again, something is contingently caused; therefore the first cause causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly.

80. Proof of the first consequence: any second cause causes insofar as it is moved by the first cause; therefore if the first cause moves necessarily, any other cause is moved necessarily and anything else is caused necessarily;     therefore if some second cause moves contingently, the first cause too will move contingently, because the second cause, to the extent it is moved by the first cause, does not cause save in virtue of the first cause.

81. Proof of the second consequence: there is no principle of contingent operation save the will or something concomitant to will, because any other thing acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently; therefore etc     .

82. There is an instance against this reason, and first against the first consequence the argument is as follows, that our own willing could yet cause something contingently, and so there is no requirement that the first cause contingently cause it.

83. Again, the Philosopher conceded the antecedent, namely that something is contingently caused, and he denied the consequent in the sense of understanding it of will, namely that the first cause causes contingently, by positing contingency in inferior things, not because God wills contingently, but as a result of motion, which causes necessarily insofar as it is uniform but has deformity, and so contingency, following from its parts.

84. Against the second consequence, ‘if it causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly’: this does not seem to hold, because some of the things that are moved naturally can be impeded, and so the opposite can - contingently and violently - come about.

85. To the first [n.82] one must say that if God is the first moving or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows about it as about other things, because he necessarily either moves the will immediately or he moves another thing and this other thing, having been necessarily moved, would necessarily move the will, because this other thing only moves from the fact that it is moved. The ultimate result is that what is proximate to the will would necessarily move the will, even if what is proximate to the will is the will itself; and so it will necessarily will, and it will be necessarily willing. And further the impossibility follows that he necessarily causes whatever is caused.

86. To the second [n.83] I say that I do not here call contingent what is nonnecessary or non-eternal, but something whose opposite might happen when that something happens; therefore I said ‘something is contingently caused’ [n.79], and not ‘something is contingent’. Now I say that the Philosopher cannot deny the consequent by saving the antecedent through recourse to motion [n.83], because if that whole motion is from its cause necessarily, any part of it is necessarily caused when it is caused, that is, it is caused inevitably, so that the opposite cannot then be caused; and further, what is caused by any part of the motion is caused necessarily and unavoidably. Either therefore nothing happens contingently, that is avoidably, or the first thing causes immediately in such a way that it might also not cause.

87. To the third [n.84] I say that if some cause can impede it, this is only in virtue of a superior cause, and so on right up to the first cause, and if the first cause necessarily moves the cause immediate to itself, there will be necessity right up to the end; therefore it will impede necessarily, and consequently no other cause can naturally exercise its causality.Interpolation: “and because just as the first cause does everything by necessity of causality (as everyone supposes, for otherwise it would be a changeable cause), so also do all other causes. -These things that he [i.e. Scotus] says do not seem to be true, one could use the same reasoning to argue that nothing exists by chance or fortune in caused things unless the first cause acts by chance or fortune, and that as everything happens determinately in respect of the first cause so also in respect of other causes. Therefore one could reply to what he says that causes moved by the first mover do not so receive motion in a uniform way that of necessity they secondarily move in like manner as they are moved by the first cause, such that the ‘in like manner’ states the manner of moving on the part of God who makes them move; for they are indeed moved in like manner as they are moved by the first cause if the ‘in like manner’ states the manner of moving on the part of the causes that are moved. For the manner of the moving cause is not always being received in the moved cause, but the motion in the latter is received according to the mode of the receiver; therefore motion exists in it in a way other than it does in the first cause.” ⁸⁸

88. Thus therefore it seems to have been shown in a triple way that the first agent has intelligence and will, the first of which ways is that nature acts for an end and only because it is dependent and directed to the end by a knower [n.76]; the second is that the first agent itself acts for an end [nn.77-78], and the third that some effect is, when caused, contingently caused [nn.79-87].

89. Further, as to the question preliminary to infinity, I prove second that the first agent’s understanding and will are the same as its essence, and first of the volition of itself as of an object such that the act of love of the first cause is essentially the same as the nature of that cause and as the nature of every act of its will.

Proof. The causality and causing of the final cause is simply first, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 6 ch.5 (95rb), who says that “if there is knowledge about any cause whatever, knowledge about the final cause would be noblest;” for this cause, as concerns its causality, precedes the efficient cause, because it moves the efficient cause to act, - and therefore the causality of the first cause and of its causing is, according to any causation in any genus of cause, through and through un-causable. But the causality of the first end is to move the efficient cause as a thing loved; but it is the same thing for the first end to move the first efficient cause as a thing loved by it and for the first efficient cause to love the first end, because for an object to be loved by the will is nothing other than for the will to love the object. Therefore that the first efficient cause loves the first end is through and through un-causable, and so is necessary of itself, and so it will be the same as the first nature. And there is as it were a reversal of the reasoning from the opposite of the conclusion, because if the first loving is other than the first nature, then it is causable, and consequently effectible; therefore it is from some per se efficient cause which loves the end. Therefore the first loving would be caused by some love of the end prior to that caused first loving, which is impossible.

90. Aristotle shows this fact about intelligence, Metaphysics 12.9.1074b17-21, because otherwise the first thing will not be the best substance, for it is through understanding that it is honorable.

91. Second, because otherwise the continuance of its activity will be laborious for it. Again, if it is not that [sc. the same as its essence], it will be in potency to its contradictory; on that potency labor follows, according to him.Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.9.1074b28-29: “If [the first mover] is not intelligence but potentiality, the continuing of its understanding will reasonably be laborious for it.” ⁸⁹

92. These reasons can be made clear by reason.

The first [n.90] thus: since the ultimate perfection of every being in first act exists in the second act whereby it is conjoined to what is best, especially if the best acts and does not merely make (for every intelligible is active, and the first nature is intelligible, from the previous conclusion [nn.75-88]), the consequence is that its ultimate perfection will be in second act;     therefore if this act is not the substance of it, its substance will not be best, because its best is some other thing.

93. The second reason [n.91] can be made clear thus: a potency merely receptive is a potency for the contradictory; therefore since it is not of this sort [sc. in potency to the contradictory], therefore etc     . - But because according to Aristotle this reason is not demonstrative but only probable, let the intended proposition be shown in another way, from the identity of the power and of the object in itself; therefore they will have the same act. But the consequence, plainly, is not valid; an instance is that an angel understands itself and loves itself and yet an angel’s act of loving and of understanding are not the same as its substance.That is, an angel’s power of knowing and loving and what it knows and loves are the same, namely itself; but its act of knowing and loving is not itself or its substance but an accident of its substance. One cannot therefore argue from identity of power and object to identity of act of power and object. One cannot therefore use this argument to prove that the first being’s knowing and loving itself is identical with its substance. Scotus seems here to be criticizing an argument found in St. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia q.14 a.2 and ad 2; a.4. ⁹⁰

94. This conclusion, namely that the divine essence is the same as its willing itself, is true from corollaries: for it follows first that that the will is the same as the first nature, because willing exists only in the will;     therefore the will whose willing is un-causable is also un-causable;That is, if the will were caused, its act of willing would be caused, because that act would exist in something caused. ⁹¹ therefore etc     . And likewise, willing is understood to be as it were posterior to the will; yet willing is the same as the first nature; therefore the will more so.

95. Again, second, it follows that understanding itself is the same as the first nature, because nothing is loved unless it is known; therefore if loving itself is necessarily existent from itself, the consequence is that understanding itself is necessarily existent from itself.

96. And if understanding is closer to the first nature than willing, then the consequence further is that the intellect is the same as the first nature, as was just argued about the will from willing [n.94].

97. There is a fourth consequence too, that the idea of understanding itself is the same as itself, because the idea necessarily exists of itself if understanding necessarily exist of itself, and if the idea of understanding itself is as it were pre-understood in the intellect itself.

98. Having shown of self-understanding and self-willing that they are the same as the essence of the first being, I show from other things the proposition intended, namely about all its understanding and willing.

And let the third conclusion be this: no understanding can be an accident of the first nature. The proof is that it has been shown of the first nature that it is in itself the first effective thing [nn.43-56]; therefore it has from itself the resources whence, after everything else has been removed, it can cause anything causable, at least as first cause of the causable. But with its knowledge removed it does not have the resources whence it might cause the causable; therefore knowledge of anything else whatever is not other than its nature. - The proof of the assumption is that nothing can cause except from love of the end, by loving it, because it cannot otherwise be a per se agent, because neither can it act, for an end; as it is, however, there is pre-understood in its willing of anything for the end its understanding of it; therefore before the first moment in which it is understood to be causing or willing a, necessarily it is pre-understood to be understanding a; so without this it cannot per se bring a about, and so in the case of other things.

99. Again, the same thing is proved because all understandings of the same intellect have a like relation to the intellect, according to their essential identity or accidental identity with it (as is clear of every created intellect and its understandings), because they seem to be perfections of the same genus; therefore if some of them have a subject that receives them, then all of them do, and if one of them is an accident each of them is. But it cannot be that any of them is an accident in the first thing, from the preceding conclusion [n.89], because an accident would be a non-understanding of itself; therefore none of them will there be an accident.

100. Again, understanding, if it is what can be an accident, will be received in the intellect as in a subject; therefore received also in the understanding which is the same as the intellect, and thus a more perfect understanding will be in the receptive power in respect of a more imperfect understanding.

101. Again, the same understanding can be about setting several objects in order, therefore the more perfect it is the more the objects; therefore the most perfect understanding, with which a more perfect degree of being understood is incompossible, will be the same as the understanding of all objects. The understanding of the first thing is most perfect in this way; therefore it is the same as the understanding of all objects, and the understanding which is of itself is the same as itself, from what has just preceded [n.89]; therefore the understanding of all things is the same as itself. And I intend the same conclusion to be understood about willing.

102. Again, the intellect is nothing but a certain understanding; but this intellect is the same for all things, and so is something that cannot be for any other object; therefore neither can it understand any other thing. Therefore the intellect is the same as the understanding of all things. - It is the fallacy of the accident to conclude from the identity of certain things among themselves to their identity with respect to a third thing with respect to which they are extraneous;The point seems to be that one cannot conclude from identity of intellect in respect of all things to its identity with its act of understanding all things. ⁹² and it is plain from a similitude: to understand is the same as to will; ‘if therefore to understand itself belongs to something, then to will itself too belongs to the same thing’, does not follow, but it only follows that to will belongs to it; which willing indeed is something that belongs to the same thing, because one must so understand ‘same thing’ that the inference can be drawn in a divided, not a conjoined, manner, because of being an accident.The point seems to be that one cannot infer from identity of understanding and will to identity of objects understood and willed, for objects are logically extraneous to acts, and so to infer identity of the first from an identity of the second is to commit the fallacy of the accident. ⁹³

103. Again, the intellect of the first thing has one act that is adequate to itself and coeternal, because understanding itself is the same as itself; therefore it cannot have any other understanding. - The consequence is not valid. An example about the blessed who at the same time see God and something else even if they see God according to the utmost of their capacity, as is posited about the soul of Christ, and still he can see something else.

104. Again an argument: this intellect has in itself through identity the greatest perfection of understanding; therefore it has every other understanding. - Response: this does not follow, because an understanding that is lesser can be causable and therefore can differ from the un-causable, but the greatest understanding cannot.

105. The fourth principal conclusion about the intellect and the will of God is this: the intellect of the first thing understands always and with a distinct and necessary act any intelligible thing naturally before that thing exists in itself.

106. The proof of the first part is that the first thing can know what is thus intelligible; for this belongs to perfection in the intellect, to be able distinctly and actually to know any intelligible thing, nay to posit this is necessary for the idea of intellect, because every intellect is of the whole of being taken in the most common way, as will be determined later [I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.3, 8-12, 24]. But the intellect of the first thing can only have an understanding the same as itself, from what was just said [n.98]; therefore it has actual and distinct understanding of any intelligible whatever, and this the same as itself and so always and necessarily.

107. The second part, about priority, is proved thus, that whatever is the same as itself is necessarily existent, as was plain above [n.106]; but the being of things other than itself is not necessarily existent. Necessary existence is of itself prior in nature to everything non-necessary.

108. It is proved in another way, that the existence of anything else depends on the first thing as on a cause and, as a cause is of something causable, knowledge of the causable on the part of the cause is necessarily included; therefore the knowledge will be naturally prior to the very existence of the known thing.

109. The first part of the conclusion is also proved in another way, that a perfect artisan distinctly knows everything to be done before it is done, otherwise he would not operate perfectly, because knowledge is the measure by which he operates; therefore God is in possession of distinct and actual knowledge, or at any rate habitual knowledge, of all things producible by him prior to those things.

110. Against this: there is an instance about art, that universal art suffices for producing universal things [Scotus, Metaphysics I q.5 nn.3-4, VII p.2 q.15 n.1] - Look there for a response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9]. response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9].

2. The infinity of God is proved directly

111. Having shown these preliminaries I argue for infinity in four ways.

[First way] - First by way of efficacy, where the intended proposition will be shown in a twofold way: first because it is the first efficient cause of all things, second because the efficient cause, plainly, knows distinctly all make-able things; third, infinity will be shown by way of the end, and fourth by way of eminence.

The first way, on the part of the cause, is touched on by the Philosopher, Physics 8.10.266a10-24, 266b6-20, 267b17-26 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-13, because it moves with an infinite motion; therefore it has an infinite power.

112. This way is confirmed as to the antecedent as follows: the intended proposition is proved just as much whether it can move through an infinity as whether it does move through an infinity, because the existence of it must be actual just as much as the power of it is; the thing is clear of the first thing to the extent it exists of itself [n.58]. Although therefore it may not move with an infinite motion in the way Aristotle understands, yet if that antecedent is taken to be what, for its part, can move, the antecedent is held to be true and equally sufficient for inferring the intended proposition.

113. The consequence [n.111] is proved thus, that if it exists of itself, it does not move with an infinite motion by virtue of another;     therefore it does not receive its thus moving from another, but it has in its own active virtue its whole effect all at once, because it has it independently. But what has in its virtue an infinite effect all at once is infinite; therefore etc     .

114. The first consequence [n.111] is confirmed in another way thus: the first mover has all at once in its virtue all the effects that can be produced by motion; but those effects are infinite if the motion is infinite;     therefore etc     .

115. Against these clarifications of Aristotle, whatever may be true of the antecedent, yet the first consequence does not seem well proved.

Not in the first way [n.113], because a greater duration does not add any perfection, for a whiteness that persists for one year is not more perfect than if it persisted for only one day; therefore a motion of however long a duration is not a more perfect effect than the motion of one day. Therefore from the fact that the agent has all at once in its active virtue a moving with an infinite motion, the perfection is not proved to be greater in this case than in that, save that the agent moves for a longer time, and of itself; and so one would need to show that the eternity of the agent would prove its infinity, otherwise it could not be proved from the infinity of its motion. - Then as to the form of the argument: the final proposition of the confirmation [n.113] is denied, save of infinity of duration.Interpolation: “Let us inquire, therefore, how the aforesaid reasoning of the Philosopher [n.111] is conclusive! If the way of efficient causality is preferable to the other ways (the point is plain above where the ways are compared, because this way entails the others [n.111]), and if infinity is not proved by this way, how will it proved by the others?” ⁹⁴

116. The second confirmation [n.114] of the consequence is also refuted, because a greater intensive perfection is not proved by the fact that any agent of the same species can go on successively producing as much and as long as it lasts, because what has power for one such thing in one stretch of time has power by the same virtue for a thousand such things if it last a thousand stretches of time. And, among philosophers, an infinity is not possible except a numerical one of effects producible by motion (namely of effects that can come to be and pass away), because in species they posited a finitude. Therefore an intensive infinity in an agent no more follows from the fact that it has power for an infinite number of things in succession than if it has power for two things only; for only a numerical infinity is possible according to philosophers. - But if someone prove an infinity of species to be possible, by proving some of the heavenly motions to be incommensurable and so never able to return to the same form, even if they endure an infinite time and even if conjunctions infinite in species cause generable things infinite in species, whatever may in itself be true about this, yet it is nothing to the intention of the philosopher, who denied an infinity of species.

117. The ultimate probability that occurs for making clear the consequence of the Philosopher is as follows: whatever has power for many things at once, each of which requires some perfection proper to itself, is shown by the plurality of such things to be more perfect. Thus it seems one should conclude about the first agent that if it can cause infinite things all at once then its virtue must be infinite, and consequently that if the first agent has all at once the virtue to cause infinite things, then, as far depends on itself, it can produce them all at once; even if the nature of the effect does not permit of this, yet the infinity of the thing’s virtue follows. The proof of this ultimate consequence is that what cannot cause a white and a black thing is not thereby less perfect, because these things are not simultaneously causable; for this non-simultaneity comes from a repugnance in them and not from a defect in the agent.

118. And from this I prove infinity as follows:Interpolation: “...because the agent has virtue with respect to both at the same time, provided both are of themselves compatible. Let this be the major then: whatever agent has a virtue whereby, as far as depends on itself, it has power for infinite effects at the same time, even if the incompossibility of the effects prevents them being in place at the same time, that agent possesses infinite virtue [n.117]. The first agent is of this sort; therefore etc. The major was already made clear before [n.117], because a plurality of effects demonstrates a greater perfection in a cause which, as far as depends on itself, has power for that plurality at the same time; therefore an infinity of the things that it has power for at the same time, as far as depends on itself, proves the infinity of its power. Proof of the minor, because.” ⁹⁵ if the first thing had all causality formally at the same time, although the causable things might not be able to be put into being all at once, it would be infinite, because, as far as depends on itself, it could produce infinite things all at once; and having power for several things at once proves a greater power intensively; therefore if it has this power more perfectly than if it had all causality formally, its intensive infinity would follow all the more. But all the causality for anything whatever as to the whole of what exists in reality itself is had by it more eminently than if it was had by it formally.

119. Although, therefore, I believe that omnipotence properly speaking, according to the intention of theologians, is a matter of belief only and cannot be proved by natural reason, as will be said later [I d.42 q. un. nn.2-3; below n.178], nevertheless an infinite potency can be naturally proved that, as far as depends on itself, has all at once of itself all the causality able to produce infinite things, provided these infinite things are capable of being made to be all at once.

120. If you object that the first thing does not of itself have power for infinite things all at once, because it has not been proved to be the total cause of infinite things,Interpolation: “although it has all the causality of the second cause more eminently than this causality exists in the second cause, yet it does not, of itself, have power for the effects of all the second causes, because this more eminent way of possessing causality does not show that without the second causes it can be the total and immediate cause of all the effects, and so the minor premise is not gained, that the first cause has of itself power for infinite effects.” ⁹⁶ this objection poses no obstacle, because if it had all at once the source whence it was the total cause, it would be in nothing more perfect than it is now when it has the source whence it is first cause. - Also because the second causes are not required for its perfection in causing, because then a thing more removed from the first cause would be more perfect because it would require a more perfect cause. But if second causes are, according to the philosophers, required together with the first cause, this is because of the imperfection of the effect, so that the first thing along with some imperfect cause might cause an imperfect thing, because according to them it could not cause it immediately. -Also because, according to Aristotle [Metaphysics 5.16.1021b31-32, 12.7.1072b28-34], the totality of perfections is more eminent in the first thing than if their formalities themselves were present in it, supposing they could be present in it; the proof of which is that a second cause proximate to the first cause has the whole of its causative perfection from the first cause alone; therefore the first cause has that whole perfection more eminently than the second cause, which has it formally. The consequence is plain, because the first cause is the total and equivocal cause with respect to the second cause [n.69]. One may ask a similar question of the third cause with respect to the second cause or with respect to the first; if the answer is with respect to the first [sc. that the third has its whole causative perfection from the first cause], the proposition intended is gained; if with respect to the second, it follows that the second contains eminently the total perfection which is formally in the third. But the second has from the first that it thus contains the perfection of the third, from what has just been shown above [n.120]; therefore the first has to contain more eminently the perfection of the third than the second does, and so on in all other cases right up to the last cause. Wherefore that the first cause possesses eminently the whole causative perfection of all the causes, and possesses it more perfectly than if it had the causality of all of them formally, were that possible, seems in my judgment capable of being proved by the argument of Aristotle posited above [n.111] about the infinite substance, which is taken from the Physics and Metaphysics.Interpolation: “In addition to the proof just stated, which deduces the infinite virtue of the first thing from the infinite number of effects that that first thing, as far as depends on itself, is at the same time capable of, one can take a similar proof from the infinite number of causes as follows: if the first thing were able to possess formally in itself all the secondary causalities along with the first causality, it would, as far as depends on itself, be of infinite virtue in some way; therefore much more will it be infinite if it has more eminently than formally all those secondary causalities. But a reply can be made to these two proofs of the consequence given by Aristotle: As to the first of them I concede that when any one of several things requires some proper formal or at least virtual perfection in its cause, a cause that is capable of more things is more perfect than what is capable of fewer [n.117], because at the very least the several formal perfections that would be proper to those several things would be contained virtually in such a cause; only what possesses several formal perfections virtually is infinite in perfection. But whether the cause is at once or successively capable of several things none of which requires a proper formal or virtual perfection in that cause, one cannot from those several things deduce a greater perfection in the cause. Such is what the philosophers would say in the proposed case, because the infinite number of things that the first thing is capable of, as far as concerns itself, would only posit an infinity of things in number but a finitude of things in specific natures [n.116]; as it is, however, only a distinction of specific nature in the effect, and not a distinction of number, requires some other formal or virtual perfection in the cause. From this there is a response to the second proof, that second causes are not infinite in species according to Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2.994a1-2; therefore what has virtue for all those causes is not proved by this alone to be infinite in intensity. Against the first response: what is capable at the same time of more things is more powerful than what is capable of fewer things, whether these things are of different species or of the same species; therefore what is of itself capable at the same time of an infinity of things is infinite and possessed of infinite power. Against the second response: if all the secondary causalities existed formally in the first cause, there would be some virtual infinity, at least in extent, in that first cause; therefore if they exist in it more eminently, it will have some infinity in it. But not an infinity in extent, because eminence, on account of which the secondary causalities are unitive, takes away extensive infinity; therefore there will be some infinity there other than extensive; therefore an intensive infinity. To the first counter-argument [sc. against the first response]: one should deny the antecedent and say that simultaneity does nothing to prove a greater power; the case is like this fire which, if there were an infinite number of bodies in due proportion spherically surrounding it, would act on them all at the same time just as it acts now on the finite number of parts of the body spherically surrounding it. To the second counter-argument [sc. against the second response]: it would follow from this that the sun, nay that any perpetual cause capable of an infinite number of effects in succession, would be infinite. Therefore the reasoning, although it seem probable, is nevertheless sophistical, because the proposition on which the reasoning rests seems false in itself, namely that ‘all things that posit in themselves an exensive infinity posit, so as to be possessed more eminently, some virtual infinity’. This proposition is false, because they can be possessed more eminently in a finite equivocal cause; nor is it proved by this other proposition, that when things are lacking in infinity they are lacking in eminence with respect to their infinite effects; for this proposition is false, because eminence produces unity and so takes away the material extensive infinity that was there before; yet neither does it posit an intensive formal infinity, because a finite formality sufficiently contains eminently a material and extensive infinity.” ⁹⁷

121. According to this way of efficacy there is an argumentThe argument is found in St. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia q.45 a.5 ad 3, and also in Henry of Ghent. ⁹⁸ that it has infinite power because it creates, forInterpolation: “a virtue that has power over extremes infinitely distant is infinite; but divine virtue is of this sort in the case of creation.” ⁹⁹ between the extremes in the case of creation [sc. the extremes of creator and created] there is an infinite distance.Interpolation: “just as there is between something and nothing.” ¹⁰⁰ But this antecedent is set down only as something believed [n.119], and it is true thatInterpolation: “[it is true] about creation in the real order, namely such that...” ¹⁰¹ not-being would in duration as it were precede being,Interpolation: “the real being of the creature’s existence” ¹⁰² not however in nature as it were, after the way of Avicenna.Metaphysics 6 ch.2 (92ra): “Creation...is the giving of being to a thing after its absolute non-being; for a caused thing as far as concerns itself is that it not exist, but as far as concerns its cause it is that it should exist. But what belongs to a thing of itself in the intellect is prior in essence, not in time, because it belongs to it from something other than itself; therefore every created thing is a being after non-being by posterity of essence.” ¹⁰³ - The antecedent is shownInterpolation [after ‘not however’]: “it is [not however] less believed about creation in the order in which being follows not-being, the way Avicenna speaks of creation in Metaphysics 6 [quoted in previous footnote], but it has been sufficiently demonstrated” [Reportatio IA d.2 n.59]. ¹⁰⁴ by the fact that at least the first nature after God is from him and not from itself, nor does it receive being on the presupposition of anything else; therefore it is created.Interpolation: “For if it is the first efficient cause, then anything else other than it has its whole being from it, because otherwise that other thing would, in respect of some part of itself, not depend on it, and then it would not be the first efficient cause; but what thus takes its whole being from something, such that it receives by its nature being after not-being, is created; therefore etc.” ¹⁰⁵ But if one takes being and not-being as in this way prior in nature, then they are in that case not extremes of a change which that virtue would cause, nor does the causing of the effect require a changing.

But whatever may be true of the antecedent, the consequence is not proved, because when there is no distance intermediate between the extremesInterpolation: “as in the case of the continuous, whose extremes are two points” [n.60]. ¹⁰⁶ but the extremes are said to be distant precisely by reason of being extremes between each other, then there is as much distance as there is an extreme that is greater. An example: God is infinitely distant from the creature, even than the highest possible creature, not because of any distance between the extremes but because of the infinity of one extreme.

122. It is in this way, then, that contradictories are not distant by anything intermediate, because contradictories are immediate [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a12-13] - such that however little anything recedes from one extreme it is at once under the other extreme - but they are distant because of the extremes in themselves.     Therefore the distance is as great as the extreme which is more perfect; that extreme is infinite; therefore etc     .

123. There is a confirmation, that the total power over the positive term of a distance of this sort is power over the distance or the transition from extreme to extreme; therefore, from power over that transition infinity does not follow unless it follows from total power over its positive term. That term is finite.Interpolation: “Therefore power over transition to that term does not demonstratively prove an active infinite virtue.” ¹⁰⁷

124. Now as for what is commonly said, that contradictories are infinitely distant, it can be understood thus, that is, indeterminately, because just as there is no distance so small that it does not suffice for contradictories, so there is no distance so great that, even if it were greater than the greatest possible, it would not stretch itself to the contradictories. Their distance then is infinite, that is, indeterminate to any magnitude, great or small; and therefore from such an infinity of distance the consequent about an infinite power intensively does not follow, just as neither does it follow on the smallest distance in which an infinite distance is thus preserved; and what does not follow on the antecedent does not follow on the consequent either.Interpolation: “Contradiction therefore is the greatest distance and opposition, but by way of privation and indeterminately; contrariety however is the greatest distance positively, as is plain from Metaphysics 10.4.1055a9-10, 38-b4.” ¹⁰⁸

125. [The second way] - Having shown the intended proposition by way of the first efficient power, because the first efficient power involves infinity, the second way follows, from the fact that it distinctly understands all make-able things. Here I argue as follows: the intelligibles are infinite, and that actually, in an intellect that understands everything; therefore the intellect that understands them actually all at once is infinite. Of this sort is the first intellect.

126. Of such an enthymeme I prove the antecedent and the consequent.

As to all things that are infinite in potency, such that in taking one after another no end can be reached, if all these things are actual at once, they are actually infinite; intelligibles are of this sort with respect to a created intellect, as is plain, and in the divine intellect all things are at once understood actually that are understood successively by a created intellect; therefore an infinity of things is in the divine intellect actually understood. Of this sort of syllogism I prove the major (although it seems sufficiently evident), because all such things that can be taken one after another are, when they are simultaneously existent, either actually finite or actually infinite; if they are actually finite, then by taking one after another one can in the end actually take them all; therefore if they cannot all be actually taken, then if such things are actually simultaneous, they are actually infinite.

127. The consequence of the first enthymeme [n.125] I prove thus, that where a plurality requires or involves a greater perfection than a fewness does, there numerical infinity involves infinite perfection. An example: being able to carry ten things requires a greater perfection of virtue than being able to carry five; therefore being able to carry an infinite number of things involves an infinite moving virtue. Therefore, in the proposed case, since to understand a is a perfection and to understand b is similarly a perfection, there is never one and the same understanding of a and b, and with as much distinctness as two understandings would have, unless the perfections of the two understandings are included eminently in that one understanding; and thus about three understandings, and so on about an infinite number.Interpolation: “Response: numerical difference does not imply any other perfection.” ¹⁰⁹ Likewise one might also argue about the very idea of understanding what has been argued about intellect and about act, that a greater perfection in an act of understanding is implied from a plurality of things where there is the idea of distinctly understanding them, because this act must include the perfections eminently of all understanding’s proper operations, each of which, according to its proper idea, posits some perfection; therefore infinite operations involve infinite perfection.

128. Second, following on this way about the understanding of the first thing I show the intended proposition thus: a first cause to which, in accord with the utmost of its causality, a second cause adds some perfection in causing, does not seem able on its own to cause as perfect an effect as it can cause along with the second, because the causality of the first cause alone is diminished in respect of the causality of both; therefore if that which is naturally from the second cause and from the first simultaneously is much more perfectly from the first alone, the second cause adds no perfection to the first; but every finite thing adds some perfection to a finite thing; therefore such a first cause is infinite.

129. To the proposed case: the knowledge of a thing is naturally generated by that thing as from the proximate cause, and especially the knowledge which is vision or intuitive understanding; therefore if that knowledge is, without all action of such an object, in any intellect merely by virtue of another prior object which is naturally a superior cause with respect to such knowledge, the result is that that superior object is infinite in knowability, because the inferior object adds nothing in knowability to it; such a superior object is the first nature, because from the mere presence of it in the intellect of the first thing, without any other objection accompanying it, there is in the intellect of the first thing knowledge of any object whatever. Therefore no other intelligible adds anything to it in knowability; therefore it is infinite in knowability. Therefore it is such in its reality, because each thing is related to existence as it is to knowability, from Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31.

130. [Third way] - Again in the third way, namely on the part of the end [n.111], the argument is as follows: our will can desire and love, as the intellect can understand, some other thing greater than any finite thing; and it seems that the inclination to loving an infinite good supremely is more natural, for a natural inclination in the will to something is argued from this, that free will of itself, without a habit, promptly and with delight wants it; thus it seems that we experience an infinite good in an act of loving it, nay it seems that the will does not perfectly rest in some other thing. And how would it not naturally hate that other thing if it were the opposite of its object, just as it hates not-being (according to Augustine On Free Choice of the Will 3 ch.6 n.18, ch.8 n.23)? It also seems that, if the infinite were repugnant to good, the will would, under the idea of the infinite, in no way rest in good, nor would it easily tend to good, just as neither to what is repugnant to its object. This reason will be confirmed in the next way [n.136], about the intellect.

131. [The fourth way] - Again, fourth, the intended proposition is shown by way of eminence [n.111], and I argue thus: it is incompossible with the most eminent thing that something else be more perfect, as was plain before [n.67]; but with a finite thing it is not incompossible that there be something more perfect; wherefore     etc .

132. The proof of the minor is that an infinite thing is not repugnant to real being; but the infinite is greater than everything finite. There is another way of arguing for this and it is the same: that to which it is not repugnant to be intensively infinite is not supremely perfect unless it is infinite, because if it is finite it can be exceeded or excelled, because to be infinite is not repugnant to it; to real being infinity is not repugnant; therefore      the most perfect real being is infinite. The minor here, which is taken up in the preceding argument, does not seem capable of being shown a priori, because as contradictories contradict by their proper ideas and as this fact cannot be proved by anything more manifest, so non-repugnant things are non-repugnant by their proper ideas and it does not seem possible for this to be shown save by explaining their ideas. Real being is not explained by anything more known, the infinite we understand through the finite (I explain this vulgarly thus: the infinite is that which no given finite thing exceeds precisely by any finite relation, but beyond any such assignable relation there is still excess).

133. Thus, however, may the intended proposition be proved: just as anything whose impossibility is not apparent is to be set down as possible, so also is that whose incompossibility is not apparent to be set down as compossible; here no incompossibility is apparent, because finitude is not in the idea of real being, nor does it appear from the idea of real being that finitude is a property convertible with real being. One or other of these is required for the aforesaid repugnance; for the properties that belong to the first real being, and are convertible with it, seem to be sufficiently known to be present in it.

134. Again there is proof thus: the infinite is not in its mode repugnant to quantity, that is, by taking part after part; therefore neither is the infinite in its mode repugnant to real being, that is, by being in perfection all at once.

135. Again, if quantity of virtue is simply more perfect than quantity of bulk, why will an infinite be possible in bulk and not in virtue? But if it is possible it is actual, as is plain from the third conclusion above, about effective primacy [n.58], and it will also be proved below [n.138].

136. Again, because the intellect, whose object is real being, finds no repugnance in understanding something infinite, nay rather the infinite seems to be the most perfect intelligible. Now it is remarkable if to no intellect a contradiction of this sort about its first object is made plain although discord in sound so easily offends the hearing; for if the discordant offends as soon as it is perceived, why does no intellect naturally flee from an intelligible infinite as from something not concordant that thus destroys its first object?

137. Hereby can be colored the reasoning of Anselm about the highest thinkable good in the Proslogion, [nn.11, 35] and his description must be understood in this way:Interpolation [in place of what follows]: “There is a supreme thinkable; the supreme thinkable is infinite; therefore there is an infinite. Proof of the major: a supreme thinkable can be thought of as existing in reality, and it cannot be thought to exist from another; therefore from itself; therefore it is from itself. Therefore that a greater than what exists only in the intellect can be thought that exists in reality must not be understood to be about the same thing [n.138]; but because the merely thinkable is merely possible, something of itself necessary is greater than any possible. - Alternatively, the highest thinkable is intuitable; not in another; therefore in itself [n.139].” ¹¹⁰

God is that than which, when known without contradiction, a greater cannot be thought without contradiction. And the fact that ‘without contradiction’ must be added is plain, for a thing in the knowing or thinking of which contradiction is included is said not to be thinkable, because in that case there are two opposed thinkables with no way of producing a single thinkable thing, because neither determines the other.Interpolation: “hence, that man is irrational is unthinkable. Hence, just as in reality nothing exists save it be simple or composed of potency and act, so in concepts; but contradictories make nothing that is one, whether simple or complex.” ¹¹¹

138. The aforesaid highest thinkable without contradiction can exist in reality. This is proved first about quidditative being, because in such a thinkable the intellect supremely rests; therefore in that thinkable is the idea of the first object of the intellect, namely the idea of real being, and this in the highest degree. - And then the argument further is made that it exists, speaking of the being of existence: the supremely thinkable is not in the thinking intellect only, because then it would both be able to exist, because it is a possible thinkable, and not be able to exist, because existing by some cause is repugnant to its idea,A fallacy of equivocation over the term ‘possible’ seems to lurk in Scotus’ reasoning here. The existence of an infinite being is possible intrinsically because its idea involves no contradiction (unlike, say, a round square, which does involve contradiction); but if it does not in fact exist its existence is not possible extrinsically, because nothing extrinsic could make it to exist. Yet such a non-existent infinite being, although it could never in fact exist, would still, in its idea, contain no contradiction (unlike square circle). So there is no problem in supposing that an infinite being is both able and not able to exist since the ‘able’ in each case is different. ¹¹² as was clear before in the second conclusion [n.57] about the way of efficacy; therefore what exists in reality is a greater thinkable than what exists in the intellect only. But this is not to be so understood that the same thing, if it is thought on, is thereby a greater thinkable if it exists, but rather that something which exists is greater than anything which is in the intellect only.

139. Or it [Anselm’s reasoning] is colored in another way thus: what exists is a greater thinkable; that is, it is more perfectly thinkable because visible or intelligible to intuitive intellection; when it does not exist, whether in itself or in something nobler to which it adds nothing, it is not visible. But what is visible is more perfectly thinkable than what is not visible but intelligible only in the abstract; therefore the most perfect thinkable exists. - The difference between intuitive and abstract intellection, and how the intuitive is more perfect, will be touched on later [I d.3 p.1 q.1-2 nn.29, 11, 18-19; q.3 nn.24, 10, 28], and elsewhere when there will be place for it [e.g. n.394 below, d.1 n.35 above].

140. Finally the intended proposition is shown from negation of an extrinsic cause, becauseInterpolation: “matter is terminated by form as potency by act and perfection and the formal existence of it, and conversely.” ¹¹³ form is limited, or made finite, through matter;Interpolation: “as act by potency; form” ¹¹⁴ therefore what is not of a nature to be in matter is infinite.Interpolation: “of which sort is God.” ¹¹⁵,This reasoning seems to be taken from St. Thomas Aquinas. ¹¹⁶

141. This reasoning is not valid, because according to them an angel is immaterial; therefore it is in nature infinite. - Nor can they say that the existence of an angel limits its essence, because according to them existence is an accident of essence and naturally posterior; and thus in the first moment of nature the essence in itself, as prior to existence, seems to be intensively infinite, and consequently it will, in the second moment of nature, not be limitable by existence.

142. I respond briefly to the argument, for any real being has intrinsic to it its own grade of perfection, in which grade it is finite if it is finite and infinite if it can be infinite, and not by anything accidental to it.

143. There is also an argument ‘if form is limited in relation to matter, then if it is not in relation to matter it is not limited’; it is the fallacy of the consequent,The phrase ‘form is limited in relation to matter’ is really equivalent to ‘if form is in relation to matter it is limited’, so to argue ‘but some form is not in relation to matter, therefore it is not limited’ is to argue from the denial of the antecedent to the denial of the consequent, which is a fallacy. ¹¹⁷ just like ‘body is limited in relation to body, therefore if it is not in relation to body it will be infinite’; ‘therefore the furthest heaven will be actually infinite’. The sophism is the one in Physics 3.4.203b20-22, that just as body is limited first in itself,Interpolation: “by its proper terms before it is limited in reference to something else, as in the case of the heavens, therefore.” ¹¹⁸ so a finite form is finite first in itself before it is limited in relation to matter, because of such a sort is nature in real beings, that it is limited, that is, before it is united to matter, for a second finitude presupposes a first and does not cause it. Therefore in some moment of nature it will be finite in essence, therefore not made finite by existence; therefore it is not, in a second moment, made finite by existence.

144. I assert briefly one proposition, that any absolute essence finite in itself is finite as pre-understood to every comparison of itself to another essence.

145. [Epilogue] - From what has been said the solution to the question is plain. For from the first article [nn.41-73] one gets that some existent real being is simply first with a triple primacy, namely of efficacy, of end, and of eminence [nn.42-58, 60-61, 6466], and so it is simply that which is incompossible with something else being first [nn.59, 63, 67]. And in this article existence is proved of God as to the properties of God in respect of creatures, or insofar as he determines the dependence of respect of creatures on himself [n.39].

146. From the second article [nn.74-144] one gets in a fourfold way that the first thing is infinite: namely first because it is the first efficient thing [nn.111-120], second because it is the first knower of all make-able things (the second way [nn.125-127] containsInterpolation: “and on account of the second way there were prefaced there [four conclusions etc.].” ¹¹⁹ four conclusions about the intelligibility of the first thing [nn.75-110]), third because it is the ultimate end [n.130], fourth because it is eminent [n.131-136]. By occasion of the first way there is excluded a certain useless way about creation [nn.121-

124], by occasion of the second another way is touched on about the perfection and intelligibility of the first object [nn.128-129], by occasion of the fourth exposition is given of the argument of Anselm in Proslogion, ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [nn.137-139, 11, 35]; lastly there is excluded a useless way inferring infinity from immateriality [nn.140-144].

147. From the premised conclusions, proved and shown, the argument to the questionInterpolation: “Therefore join the conclusions of the first two articles with the conclusion of the third as follows:” ¹²⁰ goes as follows: some real being triply first among beings actually exists [nn.41-73, 145]; and that triply first thing is infinite [nn.111-141, 146]; therefore some infinite real being actually exists [n.1]. And it is the most perfect conceivable, and the most perfect, absolute conceived, that we can naturally have about God, that he is infinite, as will be said later [I d.3 p.1 qq.1-2 n.17].

And thus it has been proved that God exists as to his concept or existence, the most perfect conceivable or possible to be had by us of God.

IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

148. To the arguments of this question.

To the first [n.1] I say that an infinite cause, active by the necessity of its nature, does not allow of anything contrary to it, whether something be contrary to it formally, that is, according as something agrees with it essentially, or virtually, that is, according to the idea of its effect which it virtually includes. For in each way it would impede whatever was incompossible with its effect, as was argued before [n.3].Interpolation: “God acts freely and voluntarily with respect to everything that is extrinsic to himself.” ¹²¹

149. On the contrary: is it really the case that the philosophers, when positing that God acts from the necessity of his nature, did not posit that there was anything bad in the universe?

150. I reply: as was made evident in the proof that God is an agent through knowledge [n.86], the philosophers could not save the idea that something evil can happen contingently in the universe, but only that one order of courses would produce something that was receptive of a perfection, while another order would of necessity produce the opposite of that perfection; such that this perfection would not then be produced when all the causes came together, although absolutely a thing produced by some of the causes, when considered according to the idea of its species, would be receptive of the perfection whose opposite necessarily comes about.Interpolation: “Therefore, according to them, just as efficient causes in one and the same order act necessarily, so impeding efficient causes in another order act necessarily in impeding; hence the sun acts to dissipate things with the same necessity as Saturn acts to condense them. Since therefore every defect of matter is reduced to efficient causes that are defective in virtue, then, if any efficient cause whatever acts necessarily, no defect whether of monstrosity or of malice will exist in the universe without happening necessarily.” ¹²² But what the philosophers can say about our free choice and about badness of morals must be discussed elsewhere.

150. To the second [n.4] I say that the consequence is not valid. For proof of the consequence I say that there is not a similar incompossibility of dimensions in filling up a place and of essences in existing simultaneously. For a single entity does not so fill up the whole nature of real being that no other entity can stand along with it (but this must not be understood of spatial filling up but of, as it were, essential commensuration), but one dimension fills up the same place according to the utmost of its capacity. Therefore one entity can exist at the same time along with another, just as, in respect of place, there could exist along with a body filling the place another body not filling the place. Likewise the other consequence [n.4] is not valid, because an infinite body, if it existed along with another body, would become a greater whole than either by reason of dimensions, because the dimensions of the second body would be different from the dimensions of the infinite body, and of the same nature as them; and therefore the whole would be greater because of the diversity of dimensions, and also the whole would not be greater because an infinite dimension cannot be exceeded. Here, however, the whole quantity of infinite perfection receives, in the idea of such quantity, no addition from the coexistence of another thing infinite in such quantity.

151. To the third [n.5] I say that the consequence is not valid unless that which is pointed to in the antecedent, from which other things are separate, is infinite. An example: if there were, per impossibile, some infinite ‘where’, and an infinite body were to fill up that ‘where’, it would not follow that ‘this body is here such that it is not elsewhere, therefore it is finite according to where’, because the ‘here’ only points to something infinite; so, according to the Philosopher, if motion were infinite and time were infinite, it does not follow that ‘this motion is in this time and not in another time, therefore it is finite according to time’. So, in relation to the intended proposition, it would be necessary to prove that what is pointed to by the ‘here’ is finite; but if it is assumed, then the conclusion is being begged in the premises.

152. To the final one [n.6] I say that the Philosopher infers that ‘it is moved in non-time’ from this antecedent, that ‘infinite power exists in a magnitude’, and he understands ‘it is moved’ properly in the consequent, in the way motion is distinguished from mutation; and in this way the consequent involves a contradiction, and the antecedent too, according to him.Interpolation: “The Philosopher argues: ‘God is possessed of infinite power; therefore he moves in non-time.’ Declaration of the consequence:” ¹²³ But how the consequence might hold I make clear in this way: if a power is infinite and acts from the necessity of its nature, therefore it acts in non-time. For, if it acts in time, let that time be a. And let some other virtue be taken, a finite one, which acts in a finite time; let it be b. And let the finite virtue which is b be increased according to the proportion which b has to a, to wit, if b is a hundred or a thousand times a, let a hundred or a thousand times virtue be assumed for that given finite virtue. Therefore the virtue so increased will move in the time a, and so this virtue and the infinite one will move in an equal time, which is impossible if an infinite virtue moves according to the utmost of its power and necessarily so.

153. From the fact, then, that the virtue is infinite it follows that, if it act of necessity, it acts in non-time; but from the fact that it is posited in the antecedent as existing in a magnitude [n.152], it follows that, if it act about a body, it would properly move that body, which he says of extensive virtueInterpolation: “because the Philosopher calls virtue in a magnitude extensive virtue” [n.6]. ¹²⁴ per accidens. But such virtue, if it acted about a body, would have the parts of such a body at different distances with respect to it, to wit, one part of the body closer and another part further away; it also has some resistance in the body about which it acts; which two causes, namely resistance and the diverse approximation of the parts of the moveable thing to the mover, make there to be succession in the motion and make the body to be properly moved. Therefore from the fact that in the antecedent the virtue is posited as existing in a magnitude, it follows that it will properly move. And so by joining the two things together at once, namely that it is infinite and that it is in a magnitude, it follows that it will move properly in non-time, which is a contradiction.

154. But this does not follow in the case of an infinite virtue which does not exist in a magnitude; for although it act in a non-time if it acts necessarily, because this is consequent to infinity, yet it will not properly move, because it will not have in the thing it acts on those two ideas of succession [n.153]. The Philosopher, therefore, does not intend that an infinite power properly move in non-time, in the way the argument proceeds [n.6], but that an infinite power in a magnitude would properly move and in non-time [n.152], which are contradictories; and from this it follows that such an antecedent involves contradictories, namely that an infinite virtue exist in a magnitude.

155. But in that case there is a doubt. Since he posits a motive power that is infinite and naturally active, it seems to follow that it would necessarily act in non-time although it would not move in non-time, nay it will in that case not move any other thing, properly speaking; and that this follows is plain, because the thing was proved before through the reason of an infinite power acting necessarily [nn.152-153].

156. Averroes replies, Metaphysics 12 com.41, that in addition to the first mover which is of infinite power there is required a conjoint mover of finite power, such that from the first mover there is infinite motion and from the second there is succession, because there could not otherwise be succession unless the finite thing acted along with it, because if the infinite thing alone acted it would act in non-time. This is refuted later [I d.8 p.2 q. un nn.3, 8-20], where an argument on this point is directed against the philosophers who posit that the first thing does of necessity whatever it does immediately. But the argument is not difficult for Christians, who say that God acts contingently; for these can easily reply that, although an infinite power acting necessarily do according to the utmost of itself, and so in non-time, whatever it immediately does, yet an infinite virtue acting contingently and freely does not; for just as it is in its power to act or not to act, so it is in its power to act in time or to act in non-time; and so it is easy to save the fact that the first thing moves a body in time although it is of infinite power, because it does not act necessarily, nor according to the utmost of its power, namely as much as it can act, nor in as brief a time as it can act.